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Abstract 
Unemployment remains a major economic and social problem in many developed economies. This paper is 
concerned with the impact of labour market refonn as a means of combatting unemployment and of enhancing 
competitive wage detennination. The paper focusses specifically on The Netherlands and New Zealand, two 
small open economies in which unemployment rates reduced to close to half of their respective post-1980 
peaks, following refonns. The labour market policies that contributed to these outcomes are referred to as the 
'Polder' model and the 'Kiwi' model respectively. Despite some similarities, there are significant differences 
between these models. These are highlighted in the paper. It is argued that the effects of deregulation are hard 
to separate out from other influences on the labour market. The success of the deregulation policies is easily 
overstated by a selective use of labour market indicators, or by making trough to peak comparisons along the 
business cycle. 
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The long-term drift upwards of the unemployment rate in 
many developed economies has been a signific~t economic 
and social policy concern. Persistently high rates of unem-
ployment are particularly prevalent among European coun-
tries (for a survey, see eg. Bean, 1994). In the European 
Union, the average unemployment rate was I 1.3 % of the 
labour force in 1997, compared with a 7.3 %average for 
all OECD countries. Reported unemployment rates among 
OECD countries (as at late 1997) varied from 2.9 % in 
Korea to 20.8 % in Spain. 
Besides differenCes in measurement and differences in lev-
els of aggregate economic activity, there are many struc-
tural differences between countries that can account for such 
a large variation in unemployment rates. A fundamental 
question. with important policy implications, is the extent 
to which various types of regulations and rigidities in the 
labour market have led to high unemployment rates. Coe 
and Snower (1997) identify a long list of institutional char-
acteristics that could contribute to high unemployment. 
These include welfare programs with high benefit replace-
ment rates 1, high taxes and social insurance premiums lev-
ied on firms and workers, job security legislation, power-
fu l unions, collective bargaining arrangements and mini-
mum wage laws. Using a formal model, Coe and Snower 
argue that policies to remove these labour market distor-
tions are complementary. That is, they have a greater im-
pact when implemented simultaneously rather than on their 
own. From this perspective, persistently high unemploy-
ment can only be resolved by means of reforms that are 
both 'broad ' (covering a wide range of institutional arrange-
ments) and 'deep' (of substantial magnitude). 
A reluctance to implement labour market reform may be 
due to an expected growth in earnings inequality and re~ 
lated social problems (Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997). 
Alternatively, if ailing firms receive public funding to en-
sure their survival, employment and wages rn,ay be greater 
than what they would be otherwise. There may then be a 
political reluctance to encourage labour market liberalisa-
tion , because it could result in layoffs among firms that 
cannot survive in a more competitive environment (Saint-
Paull997). In any case, labour markets with rigid institu-
tional structures may permit more flexible responses of 
firms than is commonly perceived. There is a range of strat-
egies available to firms that wish to adjust the labour input 
into production. Even if there are high costs associated with 
an adjusnnent in employment through recruiuoent and lay-
offs, other forms of adjustment may be possible (Brunhes 
1989). 
Thus lhe question arises to what extent deregulation in-
deed removes constraints which firms face, with payoffs 
for overall welfare and growth, or instead simply leads to a 
change in the nature of firms' responses to shocks and little 
aggregate gain to the economy. Countries that have experi-
enced a significant degree of labour market deregulation 
can serve as a useful ' laboratory' for testing the relation-
ship between reforms aimed at labour market flexibility 
and labour market outcomes. 
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Two countries which have implemented policies aimed at 
enhancing labour market flexibility are New Zealand and 
The Netherlands. Following the introduction of such poli~ 
cies, both countries witnessed rapid declines in unemploy~ 
ment. In both countries unemployment rates decreased to 
close to half of their respective post~ 1980 peaks. These are 
the sharpest declines in unemployment among OECDcoun~ 
tries, except for the United States where the unemployment 
rate decreased recently to half the peak of9.7% recorded 
in 1982 (see OECD 1997). However, the observed sequence 
of reform followed by unemployment decline is not neces-
sarily evidence of a causal relationship, as other phenom-
ena such as the business cycle may have played an impor~ 
tantrole. 
The Netherlands and New Zealand are small open econo~ 
mies that are increasingly exposed to strong external shocks 
due to growing international economic integration and 
globalisation. Table 1 reports some key statistics for both 
economies. In real GDP terms (at the PPP exchange rate), 
the Dutch economy is about five times the New Zealand 
economy. Moreover, the Dutch economy is the more open 
of the two, with more than ha1f of GDP being exported, as 
compared with 22 % in New Zea1and. 
Labour markets in small open economies must be respon-
sive to external (and domestic) shocks in order to avoid the 
economic and social costs of high unemployment, hyster-
esis, unfilled vacancies, cost-push inflation, a declining 
competitiveness etc. In both The Netherlands and New Zea~ 
land, a significant range of measures that aim to enhance 
labour market flexibility has been implemented since 1980. 
Figure 1 shows that the unemployment rate peaked in The 
Netherlands in 1983 at 11.7 %. This peak was followed by 
a gradual decline to 53 % in 1992. After an increase in the 
unemployment rate between 1992 and 1994 (due to a short 
recession). slackness in the Dutch labour market declined 
again subsequently. 
In New Zealand, the unemployment rate peaked much later 
at 10.9 % in 1991 and declined to 6.1 % in 1995. Since 
1997, the New Zealand unemployment rate is again trending 
upwards. This is due to a decline in economic growth, with 
the economy entering into a recession in 1998. The reces-
sion has been reinforced by the financial crisis in several 
Asian emerging economies and the resulting economic 
downturn in that region. In both The Netherlands and New 
Zealand, the post~ 1980 peak in the unemployment rate co-
incided with a severe recession and the lowest point with a 
tight labour market. 
Besides a decline in the unemployment rate, the Nether-
lands and New Zealand both witnessed a rapid growth in 
total employmem during the 1990's. Consequently, the re-
duction in unemployment cannot be fully explained by a 
reduction in labour supply for given labour demand or by a 
better matching of demand and supply. Employment growth 
in The Netherlands was 1.8 % per annum over the period 
1983-93, compared with an OECD average of 0.4 % for 
the same period. New Zealand total employment growth 
for the period 1991~96 was 3.2% per annum. Employment 
growth in The Netherlands was partly stimulated by ex-
port-driven output growth and also by a consensus of real 
wage restraint in bargaining processes (eg. Goner 1998). 
Figure 1. Unemployment in the Netherlands and New Zealand, 1980-1997 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Year 
Source: Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (year book), SNZ. 
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Table 1. Key satistics on The Netherlands and New Zealand 
Population 
Total 
Units 
................................... Thousands 
Inhabitants per sq km ................ . ..Number 
Net average annual increase over previous 10 years ....•.• o/o 
Employment 
Labour force participation rate (of the civilian 
population aged 15 and over).. . ...................... % 
Total civilian employment (TCE). . ............... Thousands 
of which: Agriculture ... ... ......... . ...... % of TCE 
Industry . ...... ........ ..... .. ... . ............ % of TCE 
Services ........ ... ...... . % of TCE 
Part-time employment . . ........... % of TCE 
Gross domestic product (GDP) 
Reference 
1996 
1996 
1996 
1996 
1996 
1996 
1996 
1996 
1996 
Per capita using current PPPs .. US$ 1996 
Average annual volume growth over previous 5 years ............ % 1996 
Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) ..................................... %of GDP 1996 
of which: Machinery and equipment .......... % of GDP 1996 
Residential construction ............... % of GDP 1996 
Average annual volume growth over previous 5 years ............. % 1996 
Gross saving ratio ..... ..... %ofGDP 
General government 
Current expenditure on goods and services ............... %ofGDP 
Net official development assistance ... ..... %ofGDP 
Indicators of living standards 
Private consumption per capita using current PPPs ............... US$ 
Passenger cars, per 1,000 inhabitants. . ........... Number 
Telephones, per 1,000 inhabitants.. . ... Number 
Television sets, per 1,000 inhabitants ........ Number 
Doctors, per 1,000 inhabitants .. . . .... Number 
Infant mortality per 1,000 live births.. . .... Number 
Wages and prices (average annual increase over previous 5 years) 
1996 
1996 
1995 
1996 
1994 
1994 
1993 
1995 
1995 
Wages (earnings or rates according to availability) ................ % 1996 
Consumer prices..... . ...................... % 1996 
Foreign trade 
Exports of goods, fob, as % of GDP ...................................... % 1996 
Average annual increase over previous 5 years.... . ..... % 1996 
Imports of goods, cif, as % of GDP. .... . ..................... % 1996 
Average annual increase over previous 5 year ........ % 1996 
Source: OECD Economic Surveys 
Netherlands New Zealand 
15,494 3,640 
380 14 
0.6 1.1 
59.5 65.8 
6,983 1,688 
3.9 9.5 
22.4 24.6 
73.8 65.9 
28.1 22.4 
( <35 hrs) ( <30 hrs) 
20,905 17,473 
2.3 3.7 
19.7 20.9 
9.4 10 
5 5.6 
2.2 9.6 
25.7 16 
14 14.4 
0.81 0.23 
12,477 10,895 
383 457 
509 470 
491 451 
(90) 2.5 2.1 
5.5 (94)7.2 
2.4 1.5 
2.5 2 
51.5 21.7 
8.9 8.2 
46.6 22.3 
7.8 11.8 
Similarly, employment growth in New Zealand was gener-
ated by a growth in the demand for output and a decline in 
the real wage. 
The success story of the Dutch labour market has become 
known as the Dutch "Polder model". In the New Zealand 
case, Kasper (1996) referred to the "Kiwi job creation ma-
chine". In this paper, we will simply refer to the New Zea-
land situation as the "Kiwi model". 
How successful have these models been? As Freeman 
(1998) recently argued, there are almost as many labour 
market 'models' as there are nations (and, indeed, there are 
also a wide variety of regional labour market initiatives). 
In each case, the links between the policy measures and 
the array of labour market outcomes are complex and hard 
to quantify. Moreover, even if analysts can distil the im-
pact of certain discretionary labour market measures, the 
question of which set of measures should be selected as the 
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preferred model remains an important normative problem. 
We stress that a particular stance can be easily supported 
by a selective choice of the available statistics. 
For example, Kasper's evidence for a "IGwi job creation 
machine" was based on measuring employment growth 
from the 1991 trough of the business cycle to the 1995 peak. 
Yet the economic liberalisation process had already com-
menced in New Zealand in 1984, although explicit labour 
marke~ reform was relatively minor untill991. Consistent 
labour market statistics are only available since 1986 (when 
the quarterly Household Labour Force Survey commenced). 
Total full-time employment growth over the longest time 
span of comparable data, -1986-97, was only 0.1 % per an-
num. If there is a 'success story', it is only confirmed in 
terms of employment growth by an increase in part-time 
employment (persons working 29 hours or less). The 
number of part-time jobs grew by an average of 3.9 % per 
annum over the 1986-97 period. Because part-time employ-
ment has nonelheless remained less than one quarter of to-
tal employment, the growth in full-time equivalent jobs, 
arguably the best measure of job creation growth, was 0.4 
% per annum- about the same as the OECD average. 
A coincidence of labour market reforms and favourable 
labour market outcomes is not a proof of a causal relation-
ship. To quantify the effects of labour market deregulation 
is a very difficult task, both in terms of the required data 
and in terms of the design of appropriate econometric tests. 
In this paper we will introduce and contrast the institutional 
changes since 1980 in the labour market of the two coun-
tries. Methodologies and econometric evidence rgarding 
the impact of the reforms are reviewed in Garter and Poot 
(1999). 
Labour market deregulation in the 
Netherlands 
The Dutch economic experience of the last fifteen years 
can be regarded as a blend of wage moderation and (part-
time) job growth. This development has coincided with a 
remarkable rise in female labour participation from 35 % 
to 53 %(reaching a level, however, that is still low in corn· 
parison with some other European countries). During this 
period, the Dutch government has essentially pursued the 
following socio-economic policies: (i) wage restraint to 
increase international competitiveness; (ii) monetary sta-
bility (ie. using the German Mark- Bundesbank as a guide-
line); (iii) major cuts in public expenditures (and also pub-
lic employment); (iv) reforms of the social security system 
(eg. introduction of more stringent eligibility rules); and 
(v) lower taxes (and also social charges) for fi rms to stimu-
late labour demand in general and in the ' low wage' seg-
ment of the labour market in particular. 
In recent years (since 1994), a liberal-labour government 
{a very exceptional combination in the Dutch political con-
text) has been in power. This government has introduced a 
number of new policy directions which have led, most no-
tably, to product market deregulation ( eg. anti-cartel meas-
ures in line with European regulations and less stringent 
rules on business hours [shops] and working time), and to 
the stimulation of job creation for 'di sadvantaged' groups 
(such as the long-term unemployed) by subsidising public-
sector jobs at the lower end of the labour market. 
In this paper, we concentrate exclusively on labour market 
reforms. During the sixties and seventies, the Dutch gov-
ernment was closely involved in the formation of wages 
(for an overview see eg. Poot 1980 and Van de Wijngaert, 
1994), but since 1982 it has abstained from interference in 
wage determination. Prior to 1982, however, direct inter-
vention in wage formation by the government (under the 
Wage Determination Act of 1970) was a frequent occur-
rence. The Wage Determination Act was modified in 1986 
so that governmental measures on wages became restricted 
to 'emergency situations' and severe shocks. Although in 
practice this ended governmental interference in the wage 
detennination process, the Minister of Social Affairs .and 
Employment has on occasion threatened to intervene (in 
1992 and 1993) in the interest of reducing unemployment 
(growth) and easing the burden on the social security sys· 
tern. 
More generally, the government still participates - since 
1982- in tripartite wage debate with employers and em-
ployees' associations (unions) to reach consensus on 'sen-
sible wage growth ' (that is, the government seeks to exert 
its influence through policy statements and tripartite con-
sultations). Moreover, the government is also represented-
besides the social partners- in the Social Economic Coun-
ci l (Sociaal Economische Raad) which comments on ecO· 
nomic developments in the country.2 
Hence an important change in wage policy took place in 
1982 after government had directly intervened in wage 
determination on frequent occasions during the previous 
two decades. As in many industrialised countries, the Dutch 
economy was hit by a major economic downturn at the be-
ginning of the 1980's. Unemployment increased at an enor-
mous rate, profits declined and investment funds shrunk, 
many firms faced mass dismissals (or even went bankrupt) 
and the public budget deficit reached unusually high lev-
els. The economic trends called for major corrections to 
the institutional sys tem in general (such as large cutbacks 
in governmental expenditures) and institutional arrange-
ments in the labour market in particular. Table 2 provides 
an overview of the major institutional changes since 1980. 
1982 saw the signing of a now famous agreement on col-
lective wage bargaining (in Wassenaar) which stated that 
the trade unions and employers' confederations were pri-
marily responsible for wage bargaining. A second impor-
tant outcome of the agreement was that employers acknowl-
edged the unions' interest in the development of employ-
ment, a goal which was to be achieved through the reallo-
cation of labour (by means of a general reduction of work-
ing time and the promotion of job sharing). 3 
The third key feature of the so-called "Wassenaar Accord" 
was that it put an end to the application of private wage 
growth rates to the public sector. In essence, both employ-
ers and employees agreed on wage restraints in return for 
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employment growth. In other words, the unions relinquished 
the right to automatic compensation for price inflation, 
while the employers recognised that job sharing was "one 
of the means to stem the rise in unemployment" (van Veen, 
!987). 
From 1982 onwards, a decentralisation process was set in 
motion whereby collective labour agreements were reached 
at the industry level and also - at an increasing rate - at the 
firm level.4 Nevertheless, central governmental controls did 
not entirely disappear. The government maintained its right 
to intervene (although only in exceptiorial circumstances, 
as mentioned earher), and it was also able to influence the 
consensus-building process at the national level through 
the Foundation of Labour (Stichting van deArbeid), a joint 
body comprising the employers' and employees' federa-
tions. 5 This kind of governmental persuasion exists because 
the outcomes at the national level serve as guidelines for 
industries. In this sense, one can classify this new system 
of collective wage bargaining as a mixture of decentralised 
and centralised attributes. According to Visser (1997), this 
hannonious phase in Dutch industrial relations can be char-
acterised as "a reorientation towards a highly coordinated, 
bipartite and hence non-statutory model of negotiating cen-
tral guidelines for responsible collective bargaining in sec-
tors and firms". 
Hence, the institutional setting of wage formation in The 
Netherlands has moved in a favourable direction in recent 
years. Increasing decentralisation on the one hand (with 
more firm-level agreements, especially in large companies 
like KPN Telecom, Philips, Shell, Unilever, etc.) coincides 
with maintaining centralised consensus-building negotia-
tions on the other (thereby providing a guideline for indus-
tries). Hemerijck and Van den Toren (1996) describe the 
newfound bipartite consensus as follows: " ... the 1990's ac-
cords reinstated a policy priority for voluntary wage re-
straint in the pursuit of business profitability, investment 
and employment growth and job redistribution. All the 
1990's agreements affirmed the freedom of sectoral col-
lective bargaining and the primacy of self-regulation in in-
dustrial relations." 
Table 2. A post 1980 chronology of labour market and social welfare reforms 
The Netherlands 
1982 Wassenaar Accord: decentralisation of bargaining. reduction of standard working 
1980s 
1985 
1987 
1996 
1996 
1996 
time to 38 hours per week 
decline in minimum wages 
reduction in unemployment benefits 
more stringent eligibility conditions for maximum duration of unemployment 
Central Agreement: more legal rights for flex-workers ("flexicurity") 
abolition of the Sickness Act 
Increase in working hours flexibility 
New Zealand 
1983 Introduction of voluntary unionism 
1984 More market -based bargaining under Industrial Relations Act Amendment 1984 
1987 
1988 
1989-92 
1990 
1991 
1998 
1998 
and compulsory arbitration abolished (but compulsory union membership 
reinstituted) 
Some contestability in union coverage under Labour Relations Act 1987; 
decentralised bargaining 
State Sector Act: extends the Labour Relations Act to the public sector 
Tightening of requirements, postponement of age of eligibility and reduction of 
benefits for government funded pensions 
Tightening and reduction of unemployment benefits and other government social 
transfers 
Radical reform via Employment Contracts Act 1991 (voluntary unionism, 
contestable unions, deregulation of employer-employee bargaining) 
A community wage replaces the unemployment benefit, recipients may be 
required to undergo training or carry out community work 
Invalids and sickness beneficiaries are to be assessed on their capacity to work. 
Recipients of the domestic purposes benefit must seek work when the youngest 
child reaches age 6. Subsidised childcare will be made available. 
Source: Amended and updated from Garter (1998) and Bollard et al, (1996). 
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In practice, the central employers' and workers' organisa-
tions frequently meet at the national level to formulate a 
joint declaration on bargaining and employment conditions 
at decentralised levels, before actual collective bargaining 
takes place. Hence, the institutional setting of the Dutch 
labour market can be described as harmonious with respect 
to industrial relations. 
The general trend in Dutch labour market reforms is one of 
deregulation in which flexibility for finns is matched by 
security for workers. This typical Dutch combination is re-
ferred to as "flexicurity". As regards employment protec-
tion, the firing procedure is lengthy and costly for the em-
ployer since the employer is obliged to gain permission 
from the regional employment office for each individual 
dismissal. An alternative approach for an employer to lay-
off a worker is to apply directly to the court, where the 
judge decides (relatively rapidly) on the amount of finan-
cial compensation to be paid to that worker. For the worker, 
this procedure implies that his/her chances of being fired 
may be higher, but- if this happens - substantial financial 
compensation for the job loss is likely. In practice, this sec-
ond approach to firing is becoming increasingly popular 
among Dutch employers (in the 1990's, one out of three 
cases is dealt with in this way: see Van der Heyden et al. , 
1995). 
Given these complex firing procedures for employers (see 
also eg. OECD, 1996), it makes sense for them to search 
for other methods of work force reduction. In the Dutch 
context, mention should be made of the 'escape route' 
through disability compensation. In past decades, employ-
ers resorted frequently to a policy of encouraging enrol-
ment in the social security scheme for disability compen-
sation as an alternative to firing workers. This is evidenced 
by the substantially higher proportion of disabled persons 
in The Netherlands compared with other European coun-
tries: see eg. Aarts et al, 1993). In addition to this 'abnor-
mal exploitation ' of disability enrolment, firms can also 
use voluntary quits (job-to-job movement, retirements etc.) 
to reduce their workforce. Last but not least, Dutch em-
ployers may hire workers on fixed-term contracts or ern-
ploy them through temporary work agencies. 
As for the regulations on flexible employment, these have 
three main features. First, workers on flexible contracts (so-
called 'flex-workers') have access to unemployment ben-
efits on less favourable terms than workers on permanent 
contracts. This is because benefit eligibility is determined 
by minimum thresholds values set for the number of days 
worked before becoming unemployed (moreover, pension 
funds may exclude workers on fixed-tenn contracts). Sec-
ond, employers may use flexible contracts for various pur-
poses (eg. to replace sick workers), but one of the main 
reasons is to screen new workers by means of this type of 
contract. In addition, flexible contracts are not restricted to 
particular cases or to a maximum duration. Third, Dutch 
employers are free to hire temporary workers through the 
temporary work agencies. Very recently, however, new col-
lective agreements have made labour relations for agency 
workers more secure. A collective agreement has been 
reached between the employers' association of agencies and 
the unions on minimum pension rights and the continua-
tion of employment after two years of temporary work. 
Hence, a worker's legal position becomes stronger, the 
longer s/he works on a temporary basis (moving from con-
tract to contract). The same agreement gives greater flex-
ibility to the use of agency workers: for example, employ-
ers will be allowed to hire such workers for longer durations. 
This combination of greater security for the (agency) worker 
with more flexibility for the employer neatly illustrates the 
concept of "flexicurity" in the Dutch labour market. 
Another key feature of the Dutch labour market is the 
growth in part-time employment (see also OECD, 1994). 
The share of part-time work has grown rapidly (from 15 % 
in 1975 to 30% in 1994: see eg. Hemerijck and Van den 
Toren, 1996). This trend has coincided with a rise in fe-
male labour force participation. Since November 1996, the 
Dutch government has implemented a new rule providing 
equal legal status for pan-time workers and full-time work-
ers. Moreover, equal access to unemployment benefits has 
also been secured in recent years by removing the mini-
mum thresholds for part-time workers. In the near future, 
the intention is to give full-time workers the right to work 
fewer hours (80% of a full-time working week). This may 
be especially beneficial to workers with (young) children 
who do not wish to interrupt their careers but also want to 
work fewer hours so that they can attend (partly) to their 
home duties. A further important step toward less regula-
tion of working hours was also taken in 1996, when new 
rules were gradually implemented which gave rise to an 
increase in working hours flexibility. Furthermore, it is 
possible to achieve even more flexibility in the future 
through collective bargaining agreements or through agree-
ment at the firm level (ie. the fmn's management bargains 
with the firm's so-called Enterprise CounciJI'). In this way, 
packages of working-time arrangements may be generated 
which benefit both workers and employers. For example, 
the working week may be shortened, as desired by the un-
ions, and the employer's flexibility is enhanced through 
increased flexibility in working hours, facilitating work at 
irregular hours and variable working time. Examples can 
be found in the banking sector, KPN Telecom and the civil 
service. 
As in other countries, labour market outcomes in The Neth-
erlands are greatly influenced by the social security sys-
tem. The Dutch social security system consists of social 
insurance arrangements (to insure against sickness, disa-
blement or unemployment) on the one hand and social as-
sistance (to provide a 'safety net' for those who can not 
support themselves financially) on the other. The insurance-
type arrangements are financed out of contributions by 
employees and the self-employed (based on the equiva-
lence principle), whereas the assistance-type arrangements 
are financed out of the government's general revenues 
(based on the solidarity principle). The Dutch social secu-
rity system is extensive and- according to the 1994 OECD 
survey - can be described as follows: " ... labour market 
policy remains characterised by generous income support 
measures. Replacement rates ( ... ) for all types of family 
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situations and for all unemployment spells are among the 
highest in the OECD area. "7 
In the last fifteen years, a number of changes have been 
made to the design of the social security system (see eg. 
Vijlbrief, 1992; and Visser, 1997). There have been four 
important modifications. First, unemployment benefits were 
reduced in 1985 from 80% to 70% of the pre-unemploy-
ment wage. Second, the passing of the New Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act in 1987 made the maximum duration 
of unemployment benefits more closely dependent on work 
history (ie. the period during which insurance contributions 
have been paid). Thirdly, statutory minimum wages de-
clined during the 1980's (by about 15% on average and 
even more among young people, see Mat and Teulings 
(1990)). This has direct consequences for the level of so-
cial benefits, given that the minimum social benefit level 
amounts to 70% of the minimum wage. Finally, the Sick-
ness Act was abolished in 1996. A social right for workers 
was thereby transferred to an industrial right (cf. Hemerijck 
and Van den Toren, 1996). 
To sum up, external flexibility to adjust working hours and 
the level of employment to output fluctuations seems to be 
obtained by the extensive use of part-time and flexible con-
tracts in the Dutch labour market. The use of flexible con-
tracts to adjust the demand for employment is supported 
by permissive regulations on fixed-term contracts and the 
hiring of temporary workers through temporary work agen-
cies. The permissive regulation of flexible work may in 
fact have resulted from an increase in the complexity of 
firing rules (see SchOmann et al, 1995). The flexicurity strat-
egy forms, together with measures designed to reduce the 
costs of the social security system, an essential part of the 
Dutch policy of labour market deregulation. 
Labour market deregulation in New Zealand 
Since 1984, New Zealand has undergone a far-reaching 
transformation from a very regulated and protected 
economy to one of the most liberal economies in the devel-
oped world. The impetus for this change was a set of highly 
unfavourable economic conditions in the early 1980's. 
These included unsustainable levels of public and external 
debt, rising unemployment and strong inflationary pres-
sures. The latter were kept only artificially under control 
by a wage and price 'freeze'. The economic reforms com-
menced with the election in 1984 of a Labour government. 
The promotion of fundamental liberalisation by a left-of-
centre government was a reaction to the tight and all-en-
compassing regulations imposed by the previous National 
(conservative) government rather than an acknowledged 
departure from political principles. 
The push for further liberalisation, privatisation and wel-
fare reform has continued to be the main theme of govern-
ment economic and social policy until the present, although 
with a time-varying degree of reform zeal. Reforms have 
continued irrespective of political changes, such as the 
change in government back to National in 1990 and a 
change in the electoral system to proportional representa-
tion and coalition government since 1996. 
In recent years, an extensive literature has emerged on the 
details of the economic reforms and the nature and ex ten~ 
of the impact (see eg. Bollard and Buckle, 1987; Evans et 
al, 1996; Silverstone et al, 1996; Hall, 1998). There have 
also been strong critics of the reforms, particularly among 
those who have been concerned with the social cost (eg. 
Boston and Dalziel, 1992; Kelsey, 1997). The liberalisa-
tion process has been broadly supported by most econo-
mists, although some have argued that the interpretation of 
the available data by Evans et al. (1996) has been rather 
biased, (see eg. Dalziel, 1998). In this paper, we limit our 
attention to the labour market reform that was encapsu-
lated in the Employment Contracts Act (ECA) which was 
introduced in 1991. This Act changed the industrial rela-
tions system in New Zealand fundamentally. Reviews of 
the ECA and preliminary assessments of the impact of this 
legislation can be found, inter alia, in: Harbridge, 1993; 
Harris and Daldy, 1994; Kelly, 1995; Maloney and Sav-
age, 1996; Kaspar, 1996; Brosnan and Walsh, 1996; Easton, 
1997; and Bowden, 1997" 
Until the introduction of the ECA, the New Zealand indus-
trial relations system was characterised by centralised wage 
setting and national awards. Although there have been some 
changes over time before the ECA, the formal wage set-
ting system was built upon the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act (ICA) 1894. In practice, there were three 
tiers: an Arbitration Court which delivered union-employer 
contracts ( ' awards') or 'general wage orders', some direct 
bargaining, and extensive government intervention. The 
ICA did include minimum wage provisions, but wage floors 
that protected all workers aged 20 and over were estab-
lished in the Minimum Wage Act 1945. More recently, a 
youth minimum wage was introduced in 1994. 
The pre-ECA system could be described as a system of 
"state-controlled compulsory arbitration" (eg. Maloney and 
Savage, 1996). Compulsory arbitration through the Arbi-
tration Court was aimed at 'equalising' the bargaining power 
of unions and firms. In addition to the direct impact of the 
state on the industrial relations system, the state also had a 
strong impact on labour market outcomes through 'wide' 
and 'deep' socio-economic regulation. The resulting 
economy delivered full employment until the mid-1970's, 
but has also been responsible for considerable labour mar-
ket segmentation (Brosnan et al, 1995). 
By the late 1960's the industrial relations system broke 
down as strong unions preferred second-tier bargaining with 
employers. In 1968 the union movement refused to accept 
a nil wage order. The government responded subsequently 
with direct intervention in wage determination by means 
of various Acts that were implemented during the period 
1971-84 and aimed to limit wage rises. However, the gov-
ernment did recognise that second-tier direct bargaining 
needed to be allowed eventually and such bargaining be-
came institutionalised by the Industrial Relations Act (IRA) 
1973. However, this Act cannot be seen as having enhanced 
labour market flexibility in a significant way. 
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The IRA gave existing unions monopoly power by requir-
ing registration and by compulsory membership. Minimum 
award wages and conditions were binding on all employ-
ers and employees covered by the award. In practice, there 
was a strong emphasis on maintaining relativities. More 
than two-thirds of the awards were settled with a percent-
age wage increase which was at most one percent above or 
below the award agreed by the powerful New Zealand Metal 
Trades union (see eg. Harbridge and Rae, 1992). 
However, this description of compulsory unionism and 
blanket coverage portrays a picture of a greater inflexibil-
ity than was actually the case. Only about half of the la-
bour force were, through union membership, covered by 
the Award system and although there was undoubtedly a 
significant diffusion of settlements to the non-covered sec-
tors, award rates acted only as floors for actual wages paid. 
Penal rates for overtime and other contract items provided 
additional flexibility. Employers could also adjust to chang-
ing conditions through the internal labour market (Savage, 
1989). Consequently, the New Zealand Planning Council 
(1986) concluded that their study provided "no clear evi-
dence for arguing that the New Zealand labour market is 
particularly rigid by comparison of those of other devel-
oped economies" (p.24).9 
Besides the industrial relations system, another potentially 
important influence on labour market outcomes is the sys-
tem of social welfare provisions. This was already con-
firmed by our discussion of The Netherlands in the previ-
ous section, but it is true for New Zealand also. Social wel-
fare in New Zealand is funded out of general tax revenue 
and cash benefits are indexed to the inflation rate. These 
welfare payments include an unemployment benefit that 
varied in the 1980's between about 20% of average earn-
ings for a teenager and 65% for a married person with two 
children. Non-working single parents are entitled to a "do-
mestic purposes benefit". Sickness and invalids benefits 
are related to earnings foregone and all persons aged 60 
and over receive since 1975 a relatively generous state pen-
sion (paid for from general tax revenue rather than through 
a contributory scheme). 
As noted earlier, far-reaching economic reform commenced 
in 1984 after the election of a new Labour Government. A 
chronology of reforms that explicitly concerned the labour 
market and social welfare is given in Table 2. At first, the 
changes were rather gradual and included a removal of 
compulsory arbitration and the implementation of the La-
bour Relations Act (LRA) in 1987. Although union mem-
bership remained compulsory, employers were not respon-
sible for its enforcement and union membership commenced 
to decline. Nonetheless, some unions became larger as a 
minimum size of 1000 members was imposed. 
The 1991 ECA provided the major break with the history 
of centralised collective bargaining. Firstly, the ECA es-
tabli shed voluntary unionism. Secondly, employees can 
since 1991 nominate their own bargaining agents and these 
agents are contestable. Thirdly, employees can choose to 
negotiate an individual employment contract or be bound 
by a collective contract. Fourthly, the employer does not 
need to agree to a collective contract Fifthly, the Arbitra-
tion Court was abolished and an Employment Court was 
established to resolve disputes, but not on matters of con-
tract negotations. Sixthly, the workers' right to strike was 
cunailed. Industrial action became illegal if it concerned 
bargaining over amulti-employercontract. Finally, the ECA 
did safeguard provisions regarding employment conditions 
(such as paid holidays) and minimum wages. 
The New Zealand government has been aiming recently at 
reducing further any (perceived) rigidities imposed by cur-
rent regulations regarding employment conditions. For ex-
ample, unless explicitly stated in the employment contract, 
there is no longer a legally binding minimum notice for 
termination of employment. Also, the government will pro-
pose legislation that permits an exchange of the minimum 
holiday entitlement for cash. 
Major reforms in the welfare system also took place at about 
the same time as the introduction of the ECA in 1991 . Eli-
gibility criteria were tightened and the benefit levels re-
duced. For example, persons voluntarily quitting or dis-
missed for misconduct could from then on only receive the 
unemployment benefit after a 26 weeks stand-down pe· 
riod. The changes in benefit levels and criteria were de-
signed to provide greater incentives for those on welfare to 
acti vely seek work. The mechanism for this was a reduc-
tion in the benefit-replacement ratio and in the effective 
marginal tax rate (EMTR)L0. The EMTR on earned income 
was in excess of 100% in some cases before the reforms 
(eg. Maloney, 1997). 
As was the case with respect to industrial relations legisla-
tion, there continued to be a perception after 1991 among 
Cabinet, influential government departments such as Treas-
ury and business lobby groups that additional reforms in 
the income support area needed to be implemented (eg. 
Cox, 1998). Recently, a system of 'workfare' has been in-
troduced which forces unemployed persons under certain 
conditions to undergo training or work on community 
schemes (see Table 2). 
The labour market and welfare reforms are only two ele· 
ments of a vast array of reforms that affected all aspects of 
the New Zealand economy. These included a removal of 
barriers in trade and financial flows, the encouragement of 
foreign direct invesnnent and immigration, the removal of 
price distortions and the enhancement of competitive forces. 
corporatisation of public entities and the selling off of state 
assets. Besides the direct impact on the sector targeted in 
any specific set of reforms, the other sectors were also af-
fected through the inter-industry linkages and the effects 
on final demand for output in the economy. u Labour mar-
ket and welfare reforms were implemented relatively late, 
probably because these were the areas in which a drastic 
liberalisation would have come at a high political cost for 
the Labour Government. Besides the change of government 
to a right of centre one in 1990, the fact that resistance to 
the ECA was subdued upon its implementation in 199 1 is 
likely to have been due to a general recognition that a corn-
Labour; Employment and Work in New Zealand 1998 
bination of a liberal product market and a regulated labour 
market could not be sustained (Blandy and Baker, 1987). 
Competitive forces reduced economic rents in many sec-
tors and necessitated an adjusttnent in relative wages. 
The sequencing of economic reforms is an important theo-
retical issue. It has been argued that the New Zealand 
sequencing was not optimaL Authors such as Evans et al 
(1996) and Hall (1998) argue that labour market reform 
should have been implemented before deregulation of fi-
nancial and product markets, because this could have re-
duced the decline in employment during the transition stage. 
A cross-country comparison of labour 
market reform 
There are some similarities between post 1980 labour mar-
ket reform in New Zealand and The Netherlands. In both 
countries, direct government intervention in the bargain-
ing process was effectively abolished at an early stage: 
through the 1982 Wassenaar Accord in The Netherlands 
and the policy measures introduced by the Labour Govern-
ment in New Zealand in 1984. Moreover, in both countries 
eligibility conditions for unemployment benefits were tight-
ened and benefit levels reduced. If non-standard types of 
employment are defined as being all types of employment 
besides full-time permanent jobs, then non-standard work 
has increased in both countries. As noted earlier, the major 
growth has been in part-time employment. In The Nether-
lands there has been in particular a growth in the use of 
temporary work agencies. The Central Agreement of 1996 
provided more legal rights for part-time and temporary 
workers (flexicurity). 
Besides growth in part-time employment, there is some 
evidence in New Zealand of a growth in fixed term and 
temporary employment after the introduction of the ECA, 
but a decline in casual employment in the public sector and 
little change in self employment (Brosnan and Walsh, 1996). 
Hence there is no evidence that the ECA has led to a pro-
nounced casualisation of the New Zealand work force. 
A big difference exists between the two countries in the 
extent of employment protection. In the Netherlands, an 
employer must have 'acceptable' reasons for laying off 
workers and layoff costs are very high (Hassink, 1996). 
Regulations regarding the total hours of work are also rather 
strict, although the flexibility in working hours was in-
creased in 1996. In New Zealand, the required notice of 
layoffs and the extent of severance pay can vary consider-
ably between employment contracts. In many cases the 
employer's cost of a layoff is not high. 
The biggest difference between the two countries exists in 
the extent of collective, union-negotiated contracts. In New 
Zealand, union density decreitsed from about 44% to 23% 
of the work force during the 1985-95 decade (Harbridge 
and Honeybone, 1996), although union density remained 
higher in the public sector. Besides the fraction of the work 
force that belongs to a union, additionally an estimated 7 
% of the work force are persons who do not bel~mg to a 
union but who are covered by a union-negotiated contract, 
ie. they are 'free riders' (Harbridge et al, 1997). 
In The Netherlands, union density and collective contract 
coverage are much greater. The large majority of workers 
are bound by a collective agreement or an extension (un-
ion coverage, the coverage ratio of collective agreements 
as a percentage of the dependent labour force, was 72% in 
1990, see Van den Wijngaert, 1994). Union density (de-
fined as union members aged under 65 as a percentage of 
the working population) is much lower (29% in 1990, see 
also Van den Wijngaert, 1994). Of this group, 11% of em-
ployees are covered by mandatory extension. 
It can be argued that the mandatory extension of the col-
lective labour agreements prevents low wage competition, 
thereby making the wage structure too rigid (see eg. 
Oudshoorn and Vijlbrief, 1995; Ministry of Economic Af-
fairs, 1995; and Van Wijnbergen, 1996). To date, however, 
mandatory extension has not been abolished. Moreover, 
recent research has shown that the mandatory extension 
exerts little 'upward pressure on the wage level (see Lever 
and Marquering, 1995; Van Praag and Hop, 1995; and Free-
man, Hartog and Teulings, 1996). It seems, therefore, that 
the negotiating parties take into account the position of 
weaker (ie. less profitable) firms in the industry as welL 
Recent public policy initiatives on this topic tend towards 
keeping extension. The Dutch government made this con-
ditional on what it refers to as 'good behaviour' of the ne-
gotiating parties, that is, an intention of the social partners 
to reduce entry wages and dispensation rules for new firms. 
An important element of the Dutch labour market concerns 
the link ('koppeling') between the development of contrac-
tual wages in the private sector and benefit incomes (re-
ceived when unemployed, inactive, disabled, etc.). This link 
was abandoned after the Wassenaar Accord of 1982, but 
was reinstated in 1990. However, it was then made condi-
tional on the inactivity ratio (ie. the number of benefit re-
cipients per 100 employed persons), which should be lower 
than or equal to the level of 1990 (82.6). 
Conclusions 
Our survey of Dutch and New Zealand labour market re-
forms has highlighted the complexity of this issue and the 
need to define carefully what is meant by deregulation or 
reform. While most countries will share the ultimate ob-
jectives of full employment and real earnings growth, the 
search for a set of reforms applicable to all is likely to be 
counterproductive. The impact of specific policy instru-
ments with respect to the labour market will vary between 
countries due to institutional differences, differences in the 
(sectoral) structure of the economy and cross-country dif-
ferences with respect to the behaviour of households and 
firms. 
Much of the analysis to assess the impact of labour market 
reforms has so far tended to be at the macro level, and usu-
ally focused on the effects of deregulation in one particular 
country. A comparison of the 'body of knowledge' for the 
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Table 3. Overview of studies of the economic impact of deregulation in the Netherlands 
(NL) and New Zealand (NZ) 
Descriptive: Descriptive: Models: Models: 
one country comparative one-country comparative 
The Netherlands: The Netherlands: The Netherlands: The Netherlands 
Gorter, 98 Den Broeder, 96 
Delsen, 97 
Stigter, 97 New Zealand: 
0 De Koning, 95 Easton, 97 
.... 
(J De Koning, 98 Kaspar, 96 
"' :::8 Maloney, 96 
0 New Zealand; 
"' Dilcon, 96 <!.) 
:::8 
The Netherlands: 
Delsen, 95 
E 
.Sl New Zealand: 
:::8 Harbridge, 97 
Armitage, 97 
Hector, 97 
Whatman, 94 
Brosman, 96 
Source: Compiled by the authors 
Dutch and New Zealand case conftnns this conclusion (see 
Table 3 for a concise overview), and also shows that stud-
ies at the meso-level are almost absenr. 12 Moreover, it can 
be concluded that there is a clear need for more qualitative 
and quantitative comparative studies in which institutional 
differences and their impact on economic perlonnance can 
be analysed. The macro-oriented approach basically fol-
lowed so far can only provide limited insights due a lack of 
data (shortness of relevant macroeconomic time series) and 
many confounding factors. Of particular concern is that 
many studies in the past were, for various reasons, unable 
to separate out the impact of varying levels of aggregate 
demand. The business cycle has had a major impact on the 
measures of success of labour market reform that are usu-
ally quoted in reviews of the "Polder" and "Kiwi" models. 
In any case, the benefits of labour market deregulation 
should not be exaggerated. Even within relatively rigid in-
Min. of SA, 90 Koedijk, 96 
CPB, 95 Esping, 98 
Den Butter, 97 
Gelauff, 94 
Van Sinderen, 94 
New Zealand: 
Maloney, 94 
Maloney, 95 
Maloney, 96 
Chapple, 97 
The Netherlands: 
Lever, 97 
The Netherlands: 
Abbring, 96 
Gravesteijn, 90 
Kleinknecht, 97 
stitutional slructures, flnns and workers have often found 
means to adjust to changing conditions, ie. institutional ri-
gidity does not necessarily imply market inflexibility. 
In general,labour market reforms in open economies such 
as The Netherlands and New Zealand may be seen as a 
response to growing competitive forces internationally. As 
such, the reforms appear to have been successful in increas-
ing the competitiveness of firms, leading to real wage re-
straint and in generating employment. although rather more 
in terms of growth in non-standard jobs (such as part-time" 
and temporary jobs) than standard jobs. 
Future research 
There is a notable difference between the two countries in 
the distribution of the effects across groups in society. The 
benefits of Dutch refonns appear to have been rather more 
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evenly spread across firms and workers, with an emphasis 
on consensus building and equity. In the New Zealand case, 
the reforms appear to have favoured employers more than 
workers. However, the "shadow price" of the social har-
mony associated with the Dutch Polder model is a high 
inactivity rate and consequential hidden unemployment. 
This may have an impact on social security that is not sus-
tainable in the long-run. In this respect, New Zealand has 
already made the "hard" decisions that have permitted struc-
tural surpluses on the government account. 
There is much scope for further theoretical and empirical 
work on the impact of labour market refonns. In the near 
future, it is unlikely that very conclusive results will emerge 
from further research at the macro leveL Due to the re-
cency of the most significant labour market deregulation 
measures, it will remain impossible for some time to as-
sess whether such measures reduced the natural rate of un-
employment or contributed to an increase in the long-run 
rate of economic growth. 
There is, however, a wealth of survey data in both coun-
tries that has so far only been used for descriptive accounts 
of the effects of labour market reforms. There is undoubt-
edly scope for testing fonnal theoretical models of the im-
pact of deregulation by means of such rich micro-level data. 
Notes 
1. This is the ratio of net income, when in receipt of a 
benefit, over the likely net pay when at work. 
2. Since 1995, however, consultation with the Social Eco-
nomic Council is no longer mandatory. 
3. However, two years later (in 1984) the employers op-
posed further working time reductions (see Albeda 
1985). 
4. Firm-level agreements were initially used by employ-
ers to try to de-standardise labour contracts and the 
working hours regime. 
5. Employers and employees have equal representation in 
the Foundation of Labour. 
6. The Enterprise Council is a council of elected repre-
sentatives of all the employees in a firm. 
7. See also Visser ( 1997). 
8. In addition, there are many articles in NZ Journal of 
Industrial Relations concerned with specific aspects of 
the ECA. A list of such articles can be found in, for 
example, Bronsan and Walsh (1996). 
9. See also Anderson et al. (1994) on related issues. 
10. This is equal to 100 percent times one, minus the addi-
tional net dollar income received when earning an ad-
ditional dollar of wages. 
1 L Surprisingly, few researches have attempted to quan-
tify the effects in a multi-sectoral general equilibrium 
context. 
12. See for a detailed discussion of this empirical evidence, 
Garter and Poot (1999). 
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